Limiting Trade Secret Protection by Kugler, Bruce Alan
Valparaiso University Law Review 
Volume 22 
Number 3 Spring 1988 pp.725-758 
Spring 1988 
Limiting Trade Secret Protection 
Bruce Alan Kugler 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bruce Alan Kugler, Limiting Trade Secret Protection, 22 Val. U. L. Rev. 725 (1988). 
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol22/iss3/13 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso University 
Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a 
ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu. 
LIMITING TRADE SECRET PROTECTION
INTRODUCTION
The use of trade secret law to protect proprietary assets has a dramatic
effect on employment mobility. Employers have a legitimate interest in pro-
tecting their assets and usually can protect those assets several ways. The
method of protection depends on the type of asset and the importance of the
asset. Like patent law and copyright law, trade secret law is a tool to pro-
tect proprietary assets.' Employers have a right to protect their assets
through state trade secret law.' With the increased use of trade secret law,
litigation about the scope of trade secret protection has increased. Much of
this litigation centers on the conflicts between the employer and the em-
ployee.' The conflict begins, for example, when employer A alleges that for-
mer employee X disclosed proprietary information to employer B to the
detriment of employer A. Employer A claims that the information is a trade
secret. Employee X claims that the information was merely general knowl-
edge and he in fact was never specifically informed that employer A
claimed the information as a trade secret.
Employees are faced with inequities in light of current trade secret
law. Due to the uncertainty in determining the scope of trade secret protec-
tion and the difficulty of defining a trade secret, a conflict can arise when
an employee tries to distinguish between the general knowledge he acquired
during employment and the protected trade secrets of his previous em-
ployer. When an employee terminates employment with one employer and
1. Comment, The Trade Secret Quagmire in Pennsylvania: A Mandate for Statutory
Clarification, 86 DICK. L. REV. 137, 141 (1981) [hereinafter Comment, Quagmire in Pennsyl-
vania]. Information, products, and technology will be referred to in this note as assets unless
otherwise stated.
2. Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 241 F. Supp. 549, 564 (D. Conn. 1964).
It is also desirable that established businesses be given reasonable protection against un-
fair trade practices. . . . If protection . . . is withheld, however, research and develop-
ment will be impaired, for no employer would be willing to spend large sums on research
and development of new ideas, methods and processes, if they can be freely taken and
used.
Id. See also Development-Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 890, 948 n.6 (1964). "Se-
crecy may be an attractive alternative even for innovations which probably could be patented;
the complexities of the patent system may make protection uncertain, and the business may be
depending on the research only to provide an initial competitive advantage." Id.
3. Schatzel, The Trade Secret Dilemma - Employers Beware: Are You Hiring an Em-
ployee or an Employee and a Lawsuit?, 38 U. COLO. L. REV. 311 (1966) (a great percentage
of the litigation involving trade secrets is between the employer and the employee).
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is hired by another, the employee can sometimes be held liable for the mis-
appropriation of a trade secret. The employee can be held liable if a court
determines that the employer has an asset that meets the definition of a
protectible trade secret and if the employee disclosed the information to a
competing employer.4 The uncertainty and discord are compounded by in-
consistent court decisions involving trade secrets.'
Discord exists between different jurisdictions and within jurisdictions
when courts decide the policy, theory, and outcome of trade secret protec-
tion.6 On a case-by-case basis, various solutions to the problems of trade
secret law have developed. Nevertheless, since every state court acts inde-
pendently, the result has been only a piecemeal adjustment and has resulted
in more discord in trade secret law.7 For example, every conceivable posi-
tion has been taken in determining whether a customer list can be consid-
ered an asset protectible under trade secret law.8
4. See Cherne Indus. v. Grounds & Assocs., 278 N.W.2d 81, 90-91 (Minn. 1979) (em-
ployee accused of misappropriating employer's trade secrets).
5. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Adco Chem. Co., 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 723, 751 (D.N.J.
1981), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 424 (3rd Cir. 1982) (courts acknowledge the lack of
uniformity and inconsistency in trade secret cases). "There are numerous decisions dealing
with the subject, and they are not marked by any discernable consistency. The outcomes ap-
pear to depend a great deal on the particular facts and circumstances of each case, and these
vary quite widely." Id.
6. R. SPANNER, WHO OWNS INNOVATION? 25 (1984) (there is disagreement among
courts in the same jurisdiction in determining what standard to apply in trade secret cases).
"The judicial definition of a trade secret raises more questions than it answers. And the opera-
tional definition is hardly more enlightening, consisting of little more than an enumeration of
the factors which courts utilize in deciding what kinds of information are protectable trade
secrets." Id. at 7.
7. Note, Balancing Employers' Trade Secret Interests in High-Technology Products
Against Employees' Rights and Public Interests in Minnesota, 69 MINN. L. REv. 984, 991
(1985) [hereinafter Note, Balancing Interests]. There could theoretically be fifty different
views concerning the standard to apply in trade secret cases. Each state is free to modify and
impose its own restrictions and policies concerning trade secrets.
8. There are diverse views as to the scope of trade secret law when applied to customer
lists. See, e.g., Consolidated Brands, Inc. v. Mondi, 638 F. Supp. 152 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Defi-
ance Button Mach. Co. v. C & C Metals Prods. Corp., 759 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 844 (1985) (these courts allow customer lists to qualify as trade secrets). But see
NCH Corp. v. Broyles, 563 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. La. 1983), affd in part, 749 F.2d 247 (5th
Cir. 1985); ISRA Fruit, Ltd. v. Agrexco Agricultural Export Co., 631 F. Supp. 984, 990
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (these courts held that the customer lists did not qualify as trade secrets).
"In the context of former employees soliciting customers of a former employer, however, such
information does not amount to a trade secret." Id. See also Town & Country House & Home
Serv., Inc. v. Newberry, 3 N.Y.2d 554, 560-61, 147 N.E.2d 724, 727-28, 170 N.Y.S.2d 328,
333-34 (1958); Leo Silfen, Inc. v. Cream, 29 N.Y.2d 387, 278 N.E.2d 636, 328 N.Y.S.2d 423
(1972). Generally, customer lists can be protected as trade secrets only where the customers
are not "readily ascertainable outside the business as prospective users or consumers of the
. . . services or product." Id. at 392, 278 N.E.2d at 639, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 427. See generally
M. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW HANDBOOK § 3.01 (1984), noting that the Wisconsin Su-
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This note will analyze the current state of the ever expanding scope of
trade secret law and focus on the conflicts between the employees and em-
ployers. Part I will examine the problems, interests, rights, and obligations
of employees and employers. 9 Part II will focus on the causes of decreased
employment mobility, namely the uncertainty of the definition and scope of
trade secret protection.' 0 Part III will examine current trade secret law
under the Restatement of Torts.1 Part IV will discuss the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act's solution to the trade secret controversy.' 2 Part V will examine
a theoretical model for resolving to the inequities that currently face
employees.' s
1. THE EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP
Litigation has increased between employers and past employees involv-
ing the misappropriation of trade secrets because of the uncertainty in trade
secret law. This increase in litigation arose in part because the employer
and the employee each have conflicting rights and interests to protect. 4
Fortunately, judges are aware of the clash between both of these legally
recognized interests.'5
preme Court held that customer lists could not as a matter of law be considered trade secrets
since it would be "contrary to public policy" (citing Corroon & Black-Rutters & Roberts, Inc.
v. Hosch, 109 Wis. 2d 290, 291, 325 N.W.2d 883, 887 (1982)). The Wisconsin Supreme
Court later reaffirmed the Corroon decision in Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n of Wis., 110 Wis. 2d 530, 329 N.W.2d 178 (1983).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 14-31.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 32-58.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 59-122. See also Schuman, Protecting Customer
Information Under Illinois Trade Secret Law, 70 ILL. B.J. 548, 549 n.19 (1982) (the trade
secret section was omitted from the Restatement (Second) of Torts since trade secret law was
deemed to no longer fall inside traditional tort law).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 123-32.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 133-97. The proposed theoretical model is at least
an important heuristic device and might be a significant theoretical insight into possible modi-
fications of trade secret law. Heuristic is defined as "serving to indicate or point out; stimulat-
ing interest as a means of furthering investigation ...[e]ncouraging a person to learn, dis-
cover, understand, or solve problems on his or her own, as by experimenting, evaluating
possible answers or solutions, or by trial and error ...." THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 898 (2d ed. 1987). For more explanation on the use of model
building in this note, see infra note 135.
14. Note, A Balanced Approach to Employer-Employee Trade Secret Disputes in Cali-
fornia, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 671, 673 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Balanced Approach]. "When the
former employee's knowledge includes information that is a trade secret, however, the former
employee's interest in employment mobility and the former employer's interest in protection of
the trade secret conflict sharply." Id.
15. R. SPANNER, supra note 6, at 47. See also Sloan, Trade Secrets: Real Toads in a
Conceptual Garden, I W. ST. L. REV. 113, 115 (1973). There are "competing policies in our
law; the right of a business man to be protected against unfair competition stemming from the
usurpation of his trade secrets and the right of the individual to the unhampered pursuit of the
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A. The Employee's Interests
The employee has valuable interests which if not protected can be di-
minished under the Restatement of Torts' definition of a trade secret. 6
First, reduced employment mobility can occur when an employer threatens
the employee that if he resigns and begins working for another corporation,
he will be sued since he possesses trade secrets. 17 The employee does not
want his intimate knowledge of a previous employer's business to reduce his
employment mobility and thereby compromise his ability to earn a living.
The employee desires complete control of his personal autonomy in di-
recting his career path. 8 Employment mobility should not be reduced
merely because of the employee's knowledge of the current employer's trade
secrets.
Second, the employee desires the maximum benefits from the general
work experience and does not want unreasonable restraints imposed on
him. 9 An employee may resent restrictions on the use of his knowledge
that he did not agree to before accepting the employment position.20 Cur-
rently, many employees are unaware of their obligation not to disclose cer-
tain information since they were not informed that the company regards
certain information as a trade secret.2 In short, an employee may want to
be successful in a growing competitive business, be given responsibility, be
given access to technology and proprietary information, but at the same
time the employee desires marketability if he decides to change jobs.22
Finally, when the employee changes jobs, he has an interest in nonprej-
udicial treatment by future employers. A future employer might be overly
cautious in hiring an ex-employee of a competing corporation. Future em-
ployers are aware that they too can be held liable if they hire a new em-
ployee and the employee discloses the previous employer's trade secrets. s
In essence, the future employer needs to hire an employee, not a lawsuit.
Unfortunately, future employers are justified in these fears due to the un-
occupations and livelihoods for which he is best suited." Id. (quoting Futurecraft Corp. v.
Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 286, 23 Cal. Rptr. 198, 205 (1962)).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 62-66.
17. See R. SPANNER, supra note 6, at 47.
18. Id. See also CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1016 (1986) (the court listed several employee interests such as labor mobility, em-
ployees' freedom to practice their profession, and promoting free competition).
19. Schatzel, supra note 3, at 312.
20. See Robinson, The Confidence Game: An Approach to the Law About Trade
Secrets, 25 ARZ. L. REV. 347, 348 (1983).
21. Id. "[A]n honest employee ... may be aware of his obligation to respect his former
employer's trade secrets but may have no satisfactory way to distinguish the information he
must not disclose and that which he has a right to use." Id.
22. See Note, Balanced Approach, supra note 14, at 673.
23. Robinson, supra note 20, at 364.
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certainty in trade secret law, and thus, both the employee's and employer's
interests are jeopardized.
B The Employer's Interests
The law recognizes not only the interests of the employee, but also the
interests of the employer. 4 The protection afforded to the employer under
trade secret law is uncertain.25 A corporation might invest a substantial
amount of capital and time creating an important process, technology, or
business information system. Valuable proprietary assets are at stake.2 6 Al-
though some assets of a corporation may be patentable and others may not,
the corporation has a right to rely on trade secret law for protection. 7 If an
employee discloses these trade secrets to the employer's competitor, the
competitor could get an edge in the market. In practice, therefore, the poli-
cies of trade secret law are hindered. Certainty in trade secret law would
provide incentive for corporate innovation.
If an employee is not restrained from disclosing proprietary informa-
tion of a previous employer, or if it is possible to steal or hire away a pro-
prietary asset, corporations will have less incentive to innovate new technol-
ogy. 8 An employer has a right to know what products the law will protect.
Due to the inefficiencies of state trade secret law, the qualities of a pro-
tectible product are unclear.2 9 This uncertainty causes the employer to be
less innovative since he must gamble on whether his product is protected. 0
As a result, the employer and the employee must often resort to litigation to
determine whether the asset qualifies as a trade secret. Thus, courts are left
with the task of trying to balance the conflicting interests, rights, and duties
that exist between the employer and the employee. 1
24. Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 241 F. Supp. 549, 564 (D. Conn. 1964). One policy
of trade secret law is "to protect employers against improper disclosure of information which
their employees have received in confidence." Id. at 564 (quoting Allen Mfg. Co. v. Loika, 145
Conn. 509, 517, 144 A.2d 306, 310 (1958)). See also Tempo Instruments, Inc. v. Logitek,
Inc., 229 F. Supp. I (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
25. Both the employer and the employee are uncertain about the scope of protection due
to the difficulty in deciding what actually is general knowledge. See infra text accompanying
notes 38-45.
26. Leuzzi, Process Inventions: Trade Secret or Patent Protection, 66 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 159, 159 (1984).
27. See sources cited supra note 2.
28. Robinson, supra note 20, at 348. If the employer's technology can be easily stolen,
the employer will have less incentive to innovate.
29. The Restatement of Torts' standard in determining trade secret protection is im-
practical from both the employee's and the employer's perspective. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 62-66.
30. Note, Balancing Interests, supra note 7, at 990.
31. Fleming Sales Co. v. Bailey, 611 F. Supp. 507 (N.D. Il1. 1985) (courts try to strike
a balance between the employee's and the employer's interests). See also R. ELLIs, TRADE
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II. THE REASON FOR THE CONFLICT
The conflict between the employer's and the employee's interest gener-
ally culminates in a tort suit. When an employer brings an action against a
former employee, it is usually for the misappropriation of a trade secret.32
The employee has a duty "not to use or disclose the employer's confidential
information to the employer's detriment. ' s3 To be successful in a misappro-
priation action, the plaintiff-employer must prove the following elements:34
(!) Plaintiff is the owner of a trade secret. (2) Plaintiff disclosed
the trade secret to defendant . . . (3) Defendant was in a legal
relation with reference to plaintiff as a result of which defend-
ant's use or disclosure of the trade secret to plaintiffs detriment
is wrongful. (4) Defendant has used or disclosed ...the trade
secret to plaintiff's detriment; or, defendant, who knew or should
have known of plaintiffs rights in the trade secret [used or dis-
closed the trade secret] to plaintiffs detriment.35
Unfortunately, there are two major problems with these elements which re-
sult in reduced employment mobility for the employee: the uncertainty in
determining the scope of trade secret protection;30 and the lack of any duty
SECRETS § 238-240 (1953).
32. Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., 278 N.W.2d 81 (Minn. 1979) (employer
brought misappropriation of trade secret tort suit against employees). Misappropriation is de-
fined as "[tIhe act of misappropriating or turning to a wrong purpose; wrong appropriation; a
term which does not necessarily mean peculation; although it may mean that. Term may also
embrace the taking and use of another's property for sole purpose of capitalizing unfairly on
good will and reputation of property owner." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 901 (5th ed. 1979).
See also Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868) (the first case to recognize the tort of
misappropriation of a trade secret in the United States); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416
U.S. 470, 493 n.23 (1974).
33. Hutter, Pursuing Ex-Employees Who Misappropriate Trade Secrets: Pretrial Con-
siderations, 6 LITIG. 39,40 (1980). See also R. MILGRIM, 12 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (MB)
§ 5.02(1) (1987).
34. Cf. Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., 278 N.W.2d 81, 90 (Minn. 1979).
The Cherne court cites alternative elements for the tort of misappropriation. The elements are:
"(1) the protected matter is not generally known or readily ascertainable, (2) it provides a
demonstrable competitive advantage, (3) it was gained at expense to the employer, and (4) it
is such that the employer intended to keep it confidential." Id.
35. Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F. Supp. 806, 811 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (citing
the most common element for the tort of misappropriation of a trade secret). See also Van
Prods. Co. v. General Welding and Fabricating Co., 419 Pa. 248, 213 A.2d 769 (1965); Wex-
ler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960); Macbeth-Evan Glass Co. v. Schnelbach,
239 Pa. 76, 86 A. 688 (1913). See generally R. MILGRIM, supra note 33, § 7.07(1).
36. See infra text accompanying notes 38-45. See also R. SPANNER, supra note 6, at 7.
The pragmatic definition of a trade secret is that which a judge says it is. This perspec-
tive is saved from cynicism by the fact that there is little agreement [as to] ...what
should be regarded as a trade secret and under what circumstances it should be pro-
tected, and saying a trade secret is merely what a given court says it is is not so far from
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 3 [1988], Art. 13
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of the employer to specifically notify the employee of what product, technol-
ogy, or information the corporation considers to be trade secrets."7
A. The Scope of Protection
The first uncertainty in the tort of misappropriation of a trade secret is
determining which assets qualify for trade secret protection. A court begins
this inquiry by determining whether the asset is considered general knowl-
edge. A corporation cannot protect general knowledge with trade secret
law.38 Accordingly, an employee can transfer to another employer all the
general knowledge and skill that he has acquired from a previous em-
ployer.39 "A man's aptitude, his skill, his dexterity, his manual and mental
ability" does not belong to the employer."' The law does not require the
employee's mind to be a "tabula rasa.141 The employee does not need to
erase from his mind all the general knowledge that he has learned from the
previous employer. 42
The problem and uncertainty involved in distinguishing between gen-
eral knowledge and a trade secret is that the determination depends wholly
on the facts and circumstances of each case and is purely a question of
fact.4s As one commentator stated, "differentiating between general em-
ployee knowledge and skill on the one hand and company proprietary infor-
the truth.
Id. See also Sloan, supra note 15, at 123 (calling the definition of a trade secret "far from
perfect, hyper-ambiguous").
37. See infra text accompanying notes 46-58.
38. Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 33 Ill. 2d 379, 387, 212 N.E.2d 865, 869 (1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 959 (1966). "[A]n employee may take with him, at the termination of
his employment, general skills and knowledge acquired during his tenure with the former em-
ployer. It is equally clear that the same employee may not take with him confidential particu-
larized plans or processes developed by his employer . Id.
39. Id.
40. Air Prods. & Chem., Inc. v. Johnson, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 458, 463 (Pa. Ct. Com.
Pleas 1981). See also R. MILGRIM, supra note 33, § 5.02(3).
41. Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250, 278 (S.D. Cal. 1958),
af'd, 283 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 869 (1961).
42. ILG Indus., Inc. v. Scott, 49 Ill. 2d 88, 93-94, 273 N.E.2d 393, 396 (1971). Manu-
facturer of industrial fans brought an action against former employees to enjoin those employ-
ees from using certain alleged trade secrets. The court held that certain dimensions of manu-
facturer's industrial fans were unique to the manufacturer. The court found that the drawings
containing information and specifications pertaining to the dimensions were trade secrets. Id.
See also Smith Oil Corp. v. King Chem. Co., 127 Ill. App. 3d 423, 468 N.E.2d 797 (1984);
Spring Steels, Inc. v. Molloy, 400 Pa. 354, 357-58, 162 A.2d 370, 373 (1960).
43. Telex Corp. v. Int'l Business Machs. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 928 (10th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975). A manufacturer of plug compatible electronic data processing
peripheral devices misappropriated trade secrets belonging to IBM by luring IBM's employees
away with the promise of greatly increased salaries. The manufacturer used the information
brought by the employees to gain "lead time" to manufacturer plug compatible devices. Id.
1988]
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mation on the other can almost be an occult science."",4 Therefore, the em-
ployee unfairly carries the burden of knowing whether the asset is a trade
secret or general knowledge since the employer has no duty to give the em-
ployee actual notice of the trade secret.'
B. The Lack of Notice
The second uncertainty found in the tort of misappropriation of a trade
secret is that the employer has no duty to specifically inform the employee
about what the employer considers a trade secret. Various courts reason
that actual notice to the employee is not required because the nature of the
employer-employee relationship alone puts the employee on notice of the
trade secret. 4" This reasoning seems inequitable because the traditional, le-
gal concept of scienter 4 7 requires an individual to be aware of his wrongful
actions before liability attaches.48
In traditional trade secret cases, courts reason that when an employee
enters a confidential relationship with the employer, notice is presumed and
is legally sufficient to bind the employee to non-disclosure of the employer's
trade secrets." Theoretically, the employer can bind the employee to this
confidential relationship indefinitely because the fiduciary duty survives the
termination of employment.50 Furthermore, the employee is bound even in
the absence of a restrictive covenant or an express agreement not to disclose
the employer's trade secrets. 51
44. R. SPANNER, supra note 6, at 48.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 186-92.
46. Jerrold-Stephens Co. v. Gustaveson, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 11, 15 (W.D. Mo. 1956) (an
express contract is unnecessary); R. MILGRIM, supra note 33, § 5.02(2) ("[b]ut how does an
employee know when information is reposed in him in secret and when it is not?"). But see
Shatterproof Glass v. Guardian Glass Co., 322 F. Supp. 854 (E.D. Mich. 1970), affd and
remanded, 462 F.2d 1115 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1039 (1972) (employees
were paid a very low salary and therefore were not considered to be in confidential relations by
the employment relationship alone).
47. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1207 (5th ed. 1979) (defining scienter). "The term is
frequently used to signify the defendant's guilty knowledge." Id.
48. Robinson, supra note 20, at 378.
49. Lear Siegler v. Ark-Ell Springs, Inc., 569 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir. 1978) (duty of
employee not to disclose trade secrets is implicit in the employment relationship). See also
Thiberg v. Bach, 107 F. Supp. 639, 642 (D.N.J. 1952), affd, 203 F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1953).
50. See A.H. Emery Co. v. Marcan Prods. Corp., 268 F. Supp. 289, 299 (S.D.N.Y.
1967), aff'd, 389 F.2d 11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 835 (1968) (plaintiff claimed that
its former employees misappropriated some of plaintiff's trade secrets to manufacture and sell
hydraulic load cells).
51. Abraham Zion Corp. v. LeBow, 593 F. Supp. 551, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), affid, 761
F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1985) (employee has a fiduciary duty even absent a restrictive covenant). See
also Lamdin v. Broadway Surface Advertising Corp., 272 N.Y. 133, 5 N.E.2d 66 (1936);
Byrne v. Barrett, 268 N.Y. 199, 197 N.E. 217 (1935). But see Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 174 Cal.
App. 3d 268, 219 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1985). "An agreement between employer and employee
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 3 [1988], Art. 13
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Permitting the employer to give only an implied notice to the employee
seems harsh when one considers that even scholars and judges have a hard
time deciding what actually is or is not a trade secret.52 Because courts
regard a trade secret as an important interest of a company, trade secret
law demands only implied notice.58 Since in many employment relations the
employer does not require the employee to sign a detailed trade secret
agreement, the employee must infer from the circumstances what the em-
ployer and the courts might regard as a trade secret." Consequently, the
employee will suffer the consequences of a lawsuit if he does not correctly
infer from the circumstances that certain information is protected. The re-
sponsibility of knowing whether or not the employer has a trade secret is an
unfair burden on the employee.
Placing the burden on the employee to know the existence of a trade
secret is improper and inequitable. If litigation on the tort of misappropria-
tion occurs, the court automatically assumes that the employee knew of the
trade secret when the court finds, through the factual analysis, that the
employer has a valid trade secret." But even scholars and judges have diffi-
culty determining what is a trade secret; therefore, an employee is likely to
have even more difficulty determining what the employer regards as a trade
secret.56 Furthermore, not all employees will have access to the type of in-
defining a trade secret may not be decisive in determining whether the court will so regard it."
Id. at 276, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
52. See R. SPANNER, supra note 6, at 7.
53. Note, Trade Secrets, Customer Contacts and the Employer-Employee Relationship,
37 IND. L.J. 218, 221 (1962). "The courts regard trade secrets as such an important interest of
an employer that an injunction will be issued to restrain an employee from wrongful use or
disclosure even though the contract of employment contains no restrictive covenant." Id. See
also Empire Steam Laundry v. Lozier, 165 Cal. 95, 99, 130 P. 1180, 1182 (1913).
54. In re Innovative Const. Sys., 793 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1986) (the employee is to infer
from the circumstances if the employer has a trade secret).
55. This of course presupposed that the employee and the employer had entered into a
confidential relationship. However, simply because the employee has entered a confidential
relationship does not guarantee that the employee will know with certainty what particular
information the employer considers to be trade secrets. Furthermore, the employer may have
misplaced reliance that certain information can be protected under trade secret law. See also
R. MILGRIM, supra note 33, § 4.03.
Those decisions which rely upon the concept of confidential relationship may be di-
vided into two basic approaches which parallel those used when the courts employ im-
plied contract principles. (1) Express recognition of the trade secret owner's property
right, in protection of which a court of equity will not permit one who has come to learn
the trade secret in a confidential relationship to use or disclose it to the detriment of the
owner. (2) Grant of relief upon the basis of confidential relationship without allusion to
the property right.
Id.
56. See supra text accompanying note 52 (an employee will have even more difficulty
than a judge in determining if the employer has a trade secret).
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formation needed to assess whether the asset qualifies as a trade secret.5"
For example, if the employer claims that a certain technology is a trade
secret, but the technology is widely known or held by many other compa-
nies, the technology will not qualify as a trade secret.58 In this case, placing
the burden on the employee is inequitable because the information needed
to determine whether the particular product qualifies for trade secret pro-
tection lies solely within the knowledge of the employer. Therefore, placing
the burden on the employee to know the existence of the employer's trade
secrets in some instances is inherently inequitable.
III. CURRENT TRADE SECRET LAW
Trade secret law serves several policies. One policy of trade secret law
is to protect "against breach of faith and reprehensible means of learning
another's secret."59 The Supreme Court has stated that such a policy allows
for the maintenance of ethics in the commercial world.60 Another policy
and objective of trade secret law is to encourage invention." Although the
various policy objectives of trade secret law are certain, great uncertainty
exists regarding the precise definition of a trade secret.
The Restatement of Torts and many courts have struggled with deter-
mining the appropriate definition of a trade secret.6" As one judge con-
57. See Robinson, supra note 20, at 377. "It is often very difficult, however, to distin-
guish information that is a trade secret from information that is not. The prevailing test for
making that distinction is concededly one involving difficult judgments about the extent of
outside knowledge, and the firm's efforts to develop and safeguard the information." Id.
58. See infra text accompanying note 66. One of the factors in the definition of a trade
secret is "the extent to which the information is known outside of [the employer's] business."
Therefore, technology that is widely known outside the business cannot be protected as a trade
secret.
59. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939).
60. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
61. Id. See also CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842, 850 (1st Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986). "[T]he rationale behind state trade secret law is to encourage
invention, and to provide innovators with protection for the fruits of their labors." Id. Some
scholars, however, believe that the encouragement of invention is not a valid purpose of trade
secret law. See Winston Research Corp. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir.
1965); Schulenburg, Inc. v. Signatrol, Inc., 33 Ill. 2d 379, 212 N.E.2d 865 (1965). See gener-
ally R. CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOLIES §
14.01 (4th ed. 1982). "[Alccordingly, state laws which may be designed to protect trade
secrets cannot be based on a policy of rewarding or otherwise encouraging the development of
secret processes or devices." Id.
62. Schatzel, supra note 3, at 319. "The term 'trade secret' is ambiguous and there is no
universally accepted definition. ... Id. See also Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Johnson, 219
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 458, 462 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pleas 1981). "A precise definition of a trade secret is
obviously impossible to formulate, but the Restatement again provides factors to be considered
in the determination." Id. For an excellent analysis attempting to determine the modern defini-
tion of a trade secret, see M. JAGAR, supra note 8, §§ 3.01(l)-3.04.
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ceded, "[tihe concept of a trade secret is extraordinarily difficult to de-
fine." 63 The Restatement also concedes that "[a]n exact definition of a
trade secret is not possible.""" Instead, the Restatement, in defining a trade
secret, lists six factors to be considered in the analysis:"
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of [the
employer's] business; (2) the extent to which it is known by em-
ployees and others involved in his business; (3) the extent of
measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the information;
(4) the value of the information . . .; (5) the amount of effort or
money expended by him in developing the information; (6) the
ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly
acquired or duplicated by others.6
The six factors of the Restatement of Torts must be met before an asset
qualifies for protection under trade secret law.
Of these six factors, secrecy is one of the most important requirements.
The secrecy must be beyond the mere privacy with which a business is op-
erated in normal and everyday transactions. 67 The requirement of secrecy is
an important indicator which puts the employee on inquiry notice that the
employer considers an item a trade secret. 8 Additionally, the asset must be
63. Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F. Supp. 806, 812 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
64. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939).
65. Id. The Restatement of Torts uses six factors to determine if an item qualifies for
trade secret protection. This factoring approach is one of the main reasons why it is difficult
for an employee to determine if an employer even has a trade secret.
66. See, e.g., Smith Oil Corp. v. Viking Chem. Co., 127 111. App. 3d 423, 468 N.E.2d
797 (1984). The complaint for injunction alleged that defendants possessed customer lists,
customer orders, pricing information, cost information, sample formula, product formula, and
customer correspondence. Id. at 426, 468 N.E.2d at 799. The plaintiff claimed that this mate-
rial was taken from him without authorization. Id. The court then applied the six factors from
the Restatement of Torts to determine if the plaintiff had a valid trade secret. Id. at 427, 468
N.E.2d at 800. The court relied heavily on ILG Indus. v. Scott, 49 III. 2d 88, 93, 273 N.E.2d
393, 396 (1971). See also American Wheel & Eng'g Co. v. Dana Molded Prods., Inc., 132 I11.
App. 3d 205, 476 N.E.2d 1291 (1985). See generally Klein, The Technical Trade Secret
Quadrangle: A Survey, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 437 (1960).
67. Glucol Mfg. Co. v. Schulist, 239 Mich. 70, 75, 214 N.W. 152, 153 (1927). The
plaintiff was an Ohio corporation and was engaged in the manufacturing and selling of adhe-
sives. Id. at 72, 214 N.W. at 152. The defendant worked for the plaintiff for a period of time
and then started a competing business using the formula he learned from the plaintiff. Id. The
court then had to determine if the formula was kept secret enough to qualify for protection
under trade secret law. Id. at 73, 214 N.W. at 153. See also In re Bolster, 59 Wash. 655, 656,
110 P. 547, 548 (1910).
68. See Q-CO Indus., Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). "The rule is
only that a substantial element of secrecy must exist and this means so much that except by
uses of improper means, there would be difficulty in acquiring the information." Id. at 617.
See also A.H. Emery Co. v. Marcan Prods. Corp., 389 F.2d 11, 16 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 835 (1968).
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used continuously in a business to qualify for trade secret protection.6 For
example, the salary of an employee is not protectible nor is the date on
which a new product model is to be made available to the public. 70 Finally,
even if the item is kept secret and used continuously in a business, it will
not qualify as a trade secret if it contains matters of "public knowledge,"' '
"general knowledge,"72 or "common knowledge."7"
Many courts have adopted the Restatement of Torts' method of defin-
ing a trade secret since the principles are well established.74 The Restate-
ment states that a trade secret may be a formula, pattern, device, compila-
tion of information, chemical compound, pattern, or customer list.7 5 The
Restatement, however, points out that this list serves only as an illustration
of items that can be protected by trade secret law and is not exclusive.7  In
69. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939).
70. Id.
71. See Litton Sys., Inc. v. Sundstrand Corp., 750 F.2d 952, 958 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Lit-
ton makes ring laser gyroscopes (RLG) normally formed from a thermal and mechanically
stable block of quartz ceramic material. Id. at 953. Litton filed a complaint for misappropria-
tion of trade secrets relating to the RLG. Id. The court held that "[m]atters of broad public
knowledge . . . in an industry cannot constitute confidential information or a trade secret." Id.
at 958.
72. See Aetna Bldg. Maintenance Co. v. West, 39 Cal. 2d 198, 206, 246 P.2d 11, 16
(1952) (general knowledge cannot constitute a trade secret; therefore, methods of janitorial
services and procedures for estimating the price of a new contract were held not to be trade
secrets).
73. See Wiebold Studio, Inc. v. Old World Restorations, Inc., 19 Ohio App. 3d 246, 484
N.E.2d 280 (1985). "Formulas, patterns, devices, or compilations of information of common
knowledge do not qualify as trade secrets." Id. at 284. Cf. In re Innovative Constr. Sys., 793
F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1986). The action was for the misappropriation of a formula which was
used for simulating brick paneling. The formulas were disclosed to former employees in confi-
dence and under a pledge of secrecy, Id. See also Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corp. v. Cox,
50 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (common knowledge cannot constitute a trade secret).
74. See Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Carter Prods., 230 F.2d 855, 864 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 352 U.S. 843 (1956). The defendant was unable to develop plaintiff's rising formula for
shaving cream, so he hired away from the plaintiff an employee who had worked on the devel-
opment of the formula and who was in a confidential relationship with the plaintiff. Id. For an
overview of the various jurisdictions which have cited comment b of section 757 from the
Restatement of Torts, see R. MILGRIM, supia note 33, § 2.01. See also Gilburne & Johnson,
Computer Software Protection Available in Trade Secret Law, Legal Times, Nov. 22, 1982,
at 16, col. I (most states and all federal jurisdictions use section 757).
75. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939).
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern; device or compilation of infor-
mation which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemi-
cal compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for
a machine or other device, or a list of customers.
Id.
76. Id. This list is not exclusive. Other assets could conceivably qualify as trade secrets
within the Restatement of Torts' definition. However, in order to qualify, such an asset must
fulfill the six requirements set out in § 757 comment b.
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addition, under the Restatement of Torts an item need not be patentable to
qualify as a protectible trade secret.
Trade secret law protects both patentable and nonpatentable inven-
tions"7 Case law suggests that the novelty78 and nonobviousness79 require-
ment for patentability of an invention is not essential to protect the asset
under trade secret law.80 Thus, the state of the art is irrelevant to the exis-
tence of a trade secret.8 The Restatement also does not require a product
to have these attributes to qualify for trade secret protection because it is
not granting an exclusive property right to the owner. Instead, the Restate-
ment merely punishes bad faith and wrongful misappropriation.8 2
Protecting an asset by trade secret law, as opposed to patenting the
invention, provides both advantages and disadvantages. One advantage is
that trade secret protection lasts for an infinite amount of time.8" Patent
law has a specific time limitation. Since there is no time limitation on the
amount, of protection in trade secret law, some corporations are encouraged
to keep their inventions as trade secrets rather than obtaining a patent. An-
other advantage is that a trade secret can be kept by its owner, who does
not need to be the inventor; whereas in patent law, only the inventor can
77. Schatzel, supra note 3, at 319. See also Kamin v. Kuhnau, 232 Ore. 139, 374 P.2d
912 (1962). The plaintiff perfected a so-called "packer" garbage truck body. Plaintiff commu-
nicated the improvements to the defendant in the course of a confidential relationship. The
defendant then manufactured and sold them in competition with the plaintiff. Plaintiff then
brought a suit against the defendant for the misappropriation of trade secrets. Id.
78. See Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer Sys., Inc., 318 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. 1982).
"Courts agree that trade secrets lie somewhere on a continuum from what is generally known
in a field to what has some degree of uniqueness, although there need not be the degree of
novelty or originality required for patent or copyright protection." Id. at 698. See also R.
MILGRIM, supra note 33, § 2.08(2) (novelty is not required to qualify for trade secret protec-
tion); In re Innovative Constr. Sys., 793 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1986).
79. See Computer Print Sys., v. Lewis, 281 Pa. Super. 240, 422 A.2d 148 (1980) (a
trade secret does not need to be nonobvious).
80. See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939).
81. See, e.g., Sperry Rand Co. v. Rothlein, 241 F. Supp. 549 (D. Conn. 1964). "[E]ven
if each item were disclosed by the prior art ...and the [corporation] combined them in a
method or process which produced a superior product, it still would have met the standard of a
protectible [product]." Id. at 560.
82. Root & Blyn, Abandonment of Common-Law Principles: The North Carolina Trade
Secrets Protection Act, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 823, 844 (1982). See also Wiebold Studio,
Inc. v. Old World Restoration, Inc., 19 Ohio App. 3d 246, 484 N.E.2d 280 (1985). "The
underlying principles of trade secret law, as noted by Justice Oliver W. Holmes, are not those
of property law but the equitable principles of good faith applicable to confidential relation-
ships." Id. at 248, 484 N.E.2d at 284.
83. But see Leuzzi, supra note 26, at 168. "Although the trade secret route carries the
potential for unlimited protection, it has been estimated that, as a practical matter, the aver-
age life of a trade secret is a mere three years." Id. See also Jorda, The Rights of the First
Inventor-Trade Secret User as Against Those of the Second Inventor-Patentee (Part 11), 61 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'y 593 (1979).
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obtain a patent."
Although there are advantages in protecting assets by trade secret law
rather than patent law, there are also disadvantages. One disadvantage of
protecting an invention by trade secret law is that a trade secret can be lost
by reverse engineering.8 5 For example, assume that a product is sold to the
public and the technology which created the product is protected by trade
secret law and held by company X. If company Y buys the product and its
engineers discover the technology by analyzing the product, company X can
no longer claim that the technology which created the product is a trade
secret. If company X had patented the technology, company Y could not
destroy company Xs interest by reverse engineering. In addition, if a com-
pany allows public view of its technology through tours or allows customers
to enter all areas of its facility in an unrestricted fashion, the company
stands to lose its trade secret protection." Another disadvantage of protect-
ing an asset through trade secret law is that if the trade secret is used for
more than one year in the United States, the invention will not be eligible
for patent protection if the inventor later decides to pursue a patent."7
Notwithstanding these disadvantages, companies in many instances are
choosing to protect their assets through state trade secret law rather than
patent law. Although patent law is based on federal statutes, trade secret
law developed through the state common law system.8 8 Accordingly, various
84. A. SEIDEL & R. PANITCH, WHAT THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER SHOULD KNOW
ABOUT TRADE SECRET AND EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS 3 (1973).
85. CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842, 850 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1016 (1986). "Moreover, unlike a patent, a trade secret affords no rights against indepen-
dent development of the same technology or knowledge by others." Id. See, e.g., Telex Corp. v.
Int'l Business Machs. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 929 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802
(1975) (the court discusses the possibility of reverse engineering on IBM computers). But see
ILG Indus., Inc. v. Scott, 49 Il1. 2d 88, 94, 273 N.E.2d 393, 396 (1971) (some cases hold that
the defense of reverse engineering will not work "where such a process is relatively time con-
suming and expensive"). See also Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 33 Ill. 2d 379, 386-87, 212
N.E.2d 865, 868 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 959 (1966).
86. See Cadillac Gage Co. v. Verne Eng'g Corp., 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 473, 477 (Mich.
Cir. Ct. 1978) (plaintiff gave numerous tours to visitors and prospective customers through all
parts of the facility and was therefore not entitled to protection under trade secret law). Ac-
cord National Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman, 409 S.W.2d I (Mo. 1966). See also Schuman, supra
note 11, at 552. "Trade secret status is denied when the information is generally accessible in
open files or widely and openly disseminated to the company's employees." Id.
87. A. SEIDEL & R. PANITCH, supra note 84, at 3. See also King Instrument Corp. v.
Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986) (patent in-
fringement suit related to an automated apparatus for loading magnetic blank or prerecorded
audio or video tapes into closed cassettes).
88. See Mihalek Corp. v. Mich., 595 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (trade secret law
is based on the common law of the states). Accord Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 606 F. Supp.
38 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd, 787 F.2d 655 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Permagrain Prods., Inc. v. U.S. Mat
& Rubber Co., 489 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Midland-Ross Corp. v. SunBeam Equip.
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state courts determine the extent of the protection. Historically, the state
courts have used a variety of legal theories to support their decisions. 89 The
courts have decided cases based on theories of property right,'0 contract, 1
implied contract,' 2 and breach of confidence.' 8
Scholarly articles disagree on the issue of whether trade secrets have
property qualities."' Some commentators take offense to the notion that
Corp., 316 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Pa.), affd, 435 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1970). See also Schatzel,
supra note 3, at 314. "Trade secret civil cases are covered by the common law, and judicial
attitudes vary from state to state." Id.
89. Note, Protection of Trade Secrets in the Employer-Employee Relationship, 39 No-
TRE DAME LAw. 200, 203 (1964).
90. See Glass v, Kottwitz, 297 S.W. 573, 575 (Tex. Ct. App. 1927). "It is well settled
that one who has a secret process or formula, even though unpatented, has a property right
therein, which, though subject to be lost, should one honestly discover or rightfully come into
the possession of a knowledge of the same." Id.
91. See Fralich v. Despar, 165 Pa. 24, 30 A. 521 (1894). Plaintiff employed the defend-
ant in the manufacture of certain oils and greases. Before the defendant entered such employ-
ment, he agreed not to divulge or use any secrets of the business that might be made known to
him. The court found that the agreement was read and thoroughly understood by the defend-
ant. The court held that an employee in possession of the secrets of a business under such an
agreement has no right to use the secrets for his private use. Id.
92. See 0 & W Thum Co. v. Tloczynski, 114 Mich. 149, 155, 72 N.W. 140, 143
(1897). "If it may be stated that the only agreement is an implied one, growing out of oral
statements taken in connection with the fact and circumstances surrounding the business...
we do not think it would make any difference in the principle involved." Id. Therefore, the
court gave relief to the plaintiff since the process and machinery used by the business were
regarded as secrets and were of great value. Id.
93. See Extrin Foods, Inc. v. Leighton, 202 Misc. 592, 598, 115 N.Y.S.2d 429, 434
(Sup. Ct. 1952).
Even though the contract of hiring contained no express covenant, the individual
defendants, by an implied agreement bound themselves not to disclose, reveal or appro-
priate secret processes or formulae. Liability under these circumstances is predicated on
the breach of this duty rather than on the specific property right of the plaintiff.
Id. (citations omitted). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958) (using or
disclosing confidential information). See, e.g., Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining
Co., 150 F. Supp. 143, 159 (E.D. Tex. 1956), aff'd, 259 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 903 (1959).
The essential elements of a cause of action for breach of confidence are (i) possession by
the plaintiff of knowledge or information which is not generally known, (ii) communica-
tion of this knowledge by the plaintiff to the defendant under an express or implied agree-
ment limiting its use or disclosure by the defendant, and (iii) use or disclosure by the
defendant of the knowledge or information so obtained in violation of the confidence, to
the injury of the plaintiff.
Id.
94. M. JAGER, supra note 8, § 4.01(3). The debate over whether trade secrets have
property qualities has covered many decades. Too often the argument is just a fruitless theo-
retical discussion. Generally courts use two approaches to analyze misappropriation of trade
secret cases. The breach of confidence approach focuses on whether a legal violation has oc-
curred. The property approach focuses first on the question of whether a protectible trade
secret exists and then determines if there was a misappropriation of that trade secret by an
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trade secrets constitute property. For example, Stedman, in his article
Trade Secrets,95 states: "It is, indeed, a strange form of 'property' that dis-
appears when the information it embraces becomes public or others inde-
pendently make the same discovery, and the protectability of which depends
upon the circumstances of disclosure . . .,.
The conceptual problem which Stedman addresses should not present a
barrier to the assertion that some trade secrets have property qualities.
Similar limitations are found in the law of real property. For example, a
property right in land can be extinguished or limited in several ways, most
notably by adverse possession and prescriptive easement. 97 A patent also
has property qualities; however, these property qualities also "disappear"
after seventeen years.9 8
The Supreme Court in E.L Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Mas-
land,99 decided a very influential case involving the question of whether
trade secrets have property qualities. In Masland, Justice Holmes set forth
a starting point test for trade secret litigation. "The property may be de-
nied, but the confidence cannot be, therefore, the starting point is not prop-
erty or due process of law but that the defendant stood in confidential rela-
tion with the plaintiff."100 Opponents who state that trade secrets do not
employee. Id. In spite of this circular debate, scholarly research provides a valuable tool not
merely to state in general whether trade secrets have property qualities, but to use the property
concept to categorize trade secrets. See also Ferroline Corp. v. General Aniline & Film Corp.,
207 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 953 (1954). "We are dealing with a type
of intellectual property, - in effect, a property right in discovered knowledge." Id. at 922. See
also Darsyn Laboratories, Inc. v. Lenox Laboratories, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 42 (D.N.J.), affd,
217 F.2d 648 (3d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 921 (1955); Schuster v. Pennsylvania
Turnpike Comm'n, 395 Pa. 441, 453, 149 A.2d 447, 453 (1959). The court defines property to
be "practically all valuable rights, the term being indicative and descriptive of every possible
interest which a person can have, in any and everything that is the subject of ownership by
man ... ." Id.
95. Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 4 (1962). For an excellent in-depth
analysis on the effect of the Masland decision in the debate if trade secrets have property
qualities, see R. MILGRIM, supra note 33, §§ 1.01-1.02.
96. Id. at 21.
97. Calhoun v. Smith, 387 So. 2d 821 (Ala. 1980); Tanner v. Thompson, 376 So. 2d
697 (Ala. 1980); Patient v. Stief, 49 Il1. App. 3d 99, 363 N.E.2d 927 (1977) (a property
interest in land can be extinguished by adverse possession).
98. See infra note 140.
99. 244 U.S. 100 (1917).
100. Id. at 102. See also R. CALLMAN, supra note 61, § 14.02.
The value of Justice Holmes' remark is that it reminds us that it is circular to reason that
because something is called property it should be protected; when, in fact, it is the policy
judgment that something ought to be protected that leads us to call it property in the first
place. Thus, we are required to reason from a policy basis, and not allowed to fall into
habits of mechanical jurisprudence whereby a mere label (property) automatically im-
plies a legal result (protectible).
[Vol. 22
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have property qualities regularly cite the Masland decision. However, the
statement was dictum, not the holding. Furthermore, since Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins,'' the federal court system must use state substantive law. 02
Therefore, even if one argues that the Supreme Court has held that trade
secrets have no property qualities, such an argument is not persuasive be-
cause state law, in the absence of federal preemption, controls the
question.10 3
State courts are still split on the issue of whether trade secrets have
property qualities even years after the Masland decision. 0 " Some state
courts agree with the Supreme Court's Masland decision that trade secrets
do not have property qualities.'0 6 In Northern Petrochemical Co. v. Tom-
linson,'0" the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of whether trade secrets
have property qualities. The court in Tomlinson held that trade secrets,
unlike patents and copyrights, do not have property dimensions. 0 7 Instead,
the court decided that a suit involving trade secrets should be grounded in
tort, with the act of theft as the misfeasance. 0 8
Many state courts, however, continue to suggest that trade secrets have
property qualities despite the Masland dictum. 09 As one probes into state
101. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The liability of a railroad company for injuries to plaintiff
caused by the negligent operation of its train depends, in the absence of federal or state stat-
ute, upon the unwritten law of the state where the accident occurred. Id.
102. Erie, 304 U.S. at 71 (a federal court must apply the state law as declared by the
highest state court). There are no federal statutes regulating trade secrets. Trade secrets are
wholly apart of the individual states' common law and are subject only to state statutes.
103. See also Sloan, supra note 15, at 115. "Since the advent of Erie, trade secret pro-
tection is a matter of state law, existing independently of federal patent and copyright statutes
and the common law developed as the result of their application." Id.
104. The relief granted often depends on whether a court sees the misappropriation as a
theft of employer property or as a violation of a fiduciary relationship. See Swartz, The Pro-
tection of Intangible Interests, 49 MASS. L.Q. 107, 110 (1964). "Where intangible values are
protected because they are named property, the possibility is raised that these interests might
more readily become the subject matter on which to base restitutionary recovery." Id. Even
individual judges have different perspectives and thoughts about whether trade secrets have
property qualities. See Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493, 502 (2d Cir. 1953) (salesmen who
represented the plaintiff were shown secret manufacturing processes and then afterwards used
the information to manufacture a similar product at a lower price). This particular judge and
many like him still follow the Masland theory.
105. See Wiebold Studio, Inc. v. Old World Restorations, Inc., 19 Ohio App. 3d 246,
484 N.E.2d 280 (1985) (principles of trade secret law should be based on the confidential
relationship and not property law).
106. Northern Petrochemical Co. v. Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1973).
107. Id. at 1060.
108. Id.
109. R. MILGRIM, supra note 33, § 1.01. "Recognition of trade secrets as property is a
basic conceptual step from which important aspects of trade secret law are derived. Although
some commentators are reluctant to characterize a trade secret as property, the courts have
overwhelmingly supported the property view." Id.
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substantive law to determine whether trade secrets have property qualities,
one finds that apparently many courts have explicitly rejected the Holmes'
starting point test in their analysis of whether there was a misappropriation
of a trade secret. For example in, Van Prods. Co. v. General Welding &
Fabricating Co.,110 the court took exception to Holmes' analysis in Masland
when it stated: "The starting point in every case of this sort is not whether
there was a confidential relationship, but whether, in fact, there was a trade
secret to be misappropriated.""'
Historically, courts have understood that trade secrets have property
qualities."' This was clearly stated in Zotos International, Inc. v. Ken-
nedy." 3 In the court's analysis of trade secret law, it stated that property
interests in trade secrets have been recognized in English and American
courts for over a century."" Accordingly, trade secret law provides for a
common law property right in an invention. " 5
Property qualities also have been found in trade secrets under a consti-
tutional perspective. Some trade secrets may have property qualities and,
therefore, are protected by the United States Constitution. In Ruckelhaus
v. Monsanto Co.,"' the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
there are property rights in trade secrets which are protected by the takings
clause of the fifth amendment. In Ruckelhaus, the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency required the Monsanto Corporation to submit information
about its pesticide. The submitted information would be disclosed to the
public upon request. The corporation considered this information a trade
secret." 7 Monsanto alleged that the provision effected a taking of property
without just compensation in violation of the fifth amendment." 8 The Court
admitted that it had never squarely addressed the applicability of the pro-
tection of the fifth amendment as applied to trade secrets." 9 However, the
110. 419 Pa. 248, 213 A.2d 769 (1965).
111. Id. at 268, 213 A.2d at 780 (the court rejected Holmes' starting point test citing
National Starch Prods., Inc. v. Polymer Indus., 273 A.D. 732, 79 N.Y.S.2d. 357 (1948)).
112. See C.F. Simmons Medicine Co. v. Simmons, 81 F. 163, 166 (C.C.E.D. Ark.
1897); 0 & W Thum Co. v. Tloczynski, 114 Mich. 149, 72 N.W. 140 (1897) (earlier courts
have recognized that trade secrets have property qualities).
113. 460 F. Supp. 268 (D.D.C. 1978). In Kennedy, the plaintiff engaged in the sale of
cosmetic products regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Id. at 271. The
FDA required a label to appear on the package listing the ingredients of the product. How-
ever, the regulation exempted trade secrets. Id. at 270. The court had to determine if the
plaintiff had a protectible trade secret. Id. at 272.
114. Id. at 272.
115. A. SEIDEL & R. PANITCH, supra note 84, at 1 (implicitly states that inventions not
only have statutory property qualities but also a common law basis).
116. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
117. Id. at 993.
118. Id. at 1001.
119. Id.
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Supreme Court held that trade secrets under Missouri law come under the
protection of the taking clause of the fifth amendment. 20 Thus, under a
constitutional analysis, some trade secrets may have property qualities. 11
The turmoil in present trade secret law suggests that one obvious solu-
tion would be to allow some trade secrets to be considered property and
others not.122 However, there is nothing in the present body of case law to
suggest any standard to determine whether particular trade secrets have
property qualities. The current uncertainty of the scope of trade secret pro-
tection, however, might be reduced if a standard were used to establish
property qualities in particular trade secrets.
IV. THE SOLUTION OF THE UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT
In light of the uncertainty of trade secret law, as governed by the Re-
statement of Torts, several states have looked to the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act for guidance.' 23 This Act attempts to clarify the scope of trade secret
120. Id. at 1004.
121. Another test which brings out the reality of property qualities in trade secrets can
be seen from a statutory perspective in the way the Internal Revenue Service views trade
secrets. In E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904 (Ct. Cl. 1961), the
court addressed the issue of whether trade secrets were property for tax purposes. The court
had to determine whether a transfer of a trade secret was a sale for the purpose of determining
whether the sale would be taxed as ordinary income or as capital gain. Id. at 905. The govern-
ment conceded that a trade secret is considered property within the meaning of the Internal
Revenue Code. Id. at 910. However, the plaintiff was not entitled to capital gains treatment
not because the trade secret was not considered property, but because the plaintiff could do
nothing to prevent subsequent disclosure of the secret. Therefore, it did not fulfill the Internal
Revenue Service's definition of a sale. Id. at 912. The court then distinguished between the
transfer of a patent and that of a trade secret. Id. Thus, courts have determined that trade
secrets may have property qualities using the common law, the Constitution, and statutory
analysis.
122. There are some courts that have found trade secrets to have property qualities and
other courts that do not protect trade secrets as property, but instead look to the wrongfulness
of the means obtaining the secret. See Note, Equity-Trade Secrets-Duty of Non-Disclosure
Imposed by Fiduciary Relation, 37 YALE L.J. 1154, 1155 (1928). "Many courts grant relief
• . . on the basis of the 'property right' theory." Id. But see Note, Injunction-Trade Secret-
Knowledge Gained By Fair Means, 33 YALE L.J. 439 (1924). "But, at most, it seems to be
qualified property, since . . . where the owner makes no attempt to protect the secret and it
comes to the knowledge of one who violated no trust or disclosure, no property in it will be
recognized." Id. See also Note, Developments-Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REv. 888, 948,
949 (1964); Monolith Portland & Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 407 F.2d
288, 293 (9th Cir. 1969). To date there has never been a resolution of the conflict as to
whether trade secrets have property qualities. See supra note 94 (the use of the property con-
cept to categorize trade secrets).
123. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 537, 541 (1985). Currently twenty
states have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 3426-3426.10 (West
Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-74-101 to -110 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-
50 to -58 (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2001-2009 (Supp. III 1986); 1987 ILL.
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protection, but only succeeds in multiplying the problems for employees. 2
Some of the problems are unique to the Act, but other problems are carried
over from the Restatement.2 5
A problem which is unique to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act is that
the Act expands 28 the types of assets which can qualify for trade secret
protection to include a "formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique, or process. '12 7 The Uniform Trade Secrets Act now
protects intangible business "know how.' 1 28 In addition, the Act no longer
requires that an asset be used continuously in the business.' 29 Consequently,
under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, all business information can qualify
for protection.13 This expanded protection increases the employee's poten-
tial liabilities.
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act also creates problems that are not
unique, but are carried over from the Restatement of Torts. The most obvi-
ous problem is that the Act supplies no standard for determining what qual-
LEGIS. SERV. P.A. 85-366 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 140, paras. 351-359);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-2-3-1 to -8 (West Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3320 to -3330
(1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1431 to :1439 (West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§§ 1541-1548 (West Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325C.01-.08 (West 1981 & Supp.
1988); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-401 to -409 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 598C.010-
.100 (Michie Supp. 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-25.1-01 to -08 (Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 78, §§ 85-95 (West 1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.461-.475 (1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 6-41-1 to -11 (Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-336 to -343 (1987); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 19.108.010-.940 (West 1988); W. VA. CODE §§ 47-22-1 to -10 (1986); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 134.90 (Supp. 1987).
124. See infra text accompanying note 131. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act gives no
guidance to determine general knowledge while at the same time it expands the list of products
that can be protected under trade secret law.
125. Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 126-31.
126. Comment, Quagmire in Pennsylvania, supra note 1, at 160.
127. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, supra note 123, at 542. The following elements
must be satisfied in order to protect an asset under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
Id. See also United Wild Rice, Inc. v. Nelson, 313 N.W.2d 628, 634 (Minn. 1982).
128. Comment, Quagmire in Pennsylvania, supra note 1, at 150 n.104. "[K]now-how is
defined as a body of unpatented technology useful in making a product to be sold commer-
cially. It includes a complete body of manufacturing information needed by an industrial or-
ganization to satisfactorily design, develop, fabricate and produce goods." Id. See generally
Worthing, Know-How Misuse: A Potential Weapon for Licensees, 53 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'Y 177
(1971).
129. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, supra note 123, at 543 (an item does not need to
be continuously used in a business to qualify for protection).
130. Klitzke, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 277, 287 (1980).
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ifies as general knowledge. 11 In addition, the Act still does not require the
employer to put the employee on actual notice of the trade secret. The Uni-
form Trade Secrets Act states:
"Misappropriation" means: . . . (ii) disclosure or use of a trade
secret of another without express or implied consent by a person
who . . . (B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had rea-
son to know that his knowledge of the trade secret was . . . (II)
acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain
its secrecy or limit its use .... 1"
Thus, the employee may never be specifically informed as to what the em-
ployer regards as trade secrets. Thus, on one hand, the employee can now
be held liable for disclosing a wider variety of protected assets. On the other
hand, the employee is given no clear guidance to determine whether the
asset can qualify as a protected trade secret of the employer. Therefore,
under the Act the employee is further restricted in his employment mobil-
ity. Thus, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act is not a satisfactory solution for
protecting the employer's interest while increasing employment mobility.
V. A THEORETICAL MODEL TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICT
The problems of trade secret law as viewed from the employee's per-
spective fit into two categories. First, no viable means are available for the
employee to determine whether an asset qualifies for trade secret protection
due to the difficulty in distinguishing general knowledge from proprietary
information." Second, the employer has no duty to give actual notice to
the employee as to what the employer considers to be a trade secret." 4 If
the courts divided trade secrets into two categories both of these problems
could be resolved.
This note suggests that a theoretical model"' could be constructed in
131. Id. at 290 (the Uniform Act gives no guidelines to determine whether information
is general knowledge or not).
132. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1, supra note 123, at 541.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 38-45.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 46-58.
135. A model is a mental construct useful in making predictions, rather than revealing
an ultimate truth. For example, economists use the "model of perfect competition" knowing
that this situation really never exists because the model is useful for prediction and control. R.
Stith, Jurisprudence Lecture Notes Topic VI (1988) (available at Valparaiso University
School of Law Library). Models are generally used to predict behavior; the proposed model's
purpose is not to predict behavior but to shape behavior.
In addition, a model does not claim to correspond to reality, which means that it does not
need to "make sense" or even be consistent with other models. Even though sometimes models
are mutually inconsistent, they can each be useful. Id. "Models are, moreover, to some extent
a simplification of reality. . . . Models, by simplifying reality, thus distort reality." L. MAYER,
1988]
Kugler: Limiting Trade Secret Protection
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1988
746 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22
which the items currently protected under the Restatement of Torts could
be broken down into two separate and distinct categories. Trade secret law
has always assumed that only one category of protected assets exist and is
simply labeled "trade secrets."'' 6 Under this proposed model, each category
would have a separate set of requirements that an asset must meet in deter-
mining the amount of protection to be granted. In addition, each category
would specifically list the duties, rights, and obligations of both the em-
ployer and the employee. Distinguishing the different types of protectible
assets and breaking those assets down into separate and distinct categories
could reduce the uncertainty in trade secret law.
The two categories could be labeled as "property quality" trade secrets
and "nonproperty quality" trade secrets. The courts could develop a prop-
erty quality standard by looking to patent law. By setting a "quasi-patent"
property standard, the courts could reorganize trade secret law and reduce
the confusion. A quasi-patent analysis could be used to determine whether a
trade secret has property qualities. Trade secrets which have property quali-
ties would only require the employer to give implied notice to the employee
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL INQUIRY 52-53 (1972).
On the other hand, a theory claims to be true to the inner logic and unity of phenomena,
the order of things. Unlike model builders, theorists have an obligation to be consistent be-
cause they want to be faithful to reality in a way which model builders do not. R. Stith, supra,
at Topic VI.
Theory, in the scientific sense of the concept, is understood to refer to a system of
logically related, empirically testable, lawlike propositions. Theory, in this sense, thus is
based upon both the empirically observable world and upon deductive logic. Theory is not
purely empirical in the sense of "the facts speaking for themselves"; but there is a large
element of human creativity involved in theory construction. . . . [Tiheory cannot be
held in contradistinction to practice or practicality; theory is, indirectly at least, about
practice.
L. MAYER, supra, at 48-49. (emphasis added).
"Theoretical model" as used in this note is a hybrid term to describe the various modifica-
tions of trade secret law that this note proposes. On the one hand this proposal is a theory
because the note tries to maintain an objective underlying consistency and unity with respect
to the problems associated with proposing a possible practical solution to decreased employ-
ment mobility that currently faces a multitude of employees.
On the other hand, this proposal is termed a model because the ideas in some respect are
still tenative. In addition, the proposal is still subject to modifications as the analysis of the
theoretical as well as the practical problems of implementation continue. For example, there
remain various obstacles to the implementation of this proposal such as applying a "quasi-
patent" analysis in determining if a particular trade secret has property qualities. Patent law
has developed a complex analysis in defining and determining what exactly is a "substantial
advancement over the prior art." Obviously, trade secret law would become more complicated
if a "quasi-patent" analysis were grafted into trade law secret law. In addition, if a court
determined that a "property quality" trade secret exists, it is debatable whether it could be
presumed that the employer would have necessarily surrounded the trade secret with more
secrecy precautions thereby making it obvious to the employee that a trade secret exists.
136. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939). An item is either labeled a
trade secret or it is not. There is no effort to distinguish one type of trade secret from another.
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and would be protected for an unlimited amount of time. Those trade
secrets that do not have property qualities would require the employer to
give actual notice to the employee and would be restricted in the length of
time that it could be protected. This theoretical model will still protect the
employer's interest, but will also protect some long-neglected interests of
the employees.
A. Patent Law
An employer may choose to protect his assets by obtaining a patent.
Patent protection is premised in article 1, section 8 of the United States
Constitution,1 37 and is codified in federal statutes.18 8 Objectives of the pat-
ent system include: promoting "the Progress of Science and useful Arts," '
ensuring that the public is unrestricted in obtaining the knowledge con-
tained within the patent,"'4 and mandating that inventions placed in the
hands of the public cannot be removed.'"
Several requirements must be met before a corporation is able to
choose to protect its assets under patent law. Title 35 of the United States
Code sets out the statutory requirements for patentability. 4 2 First, only cer-
137. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. See also W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW appendix B (1980). The Constitution grants Congress the power "[tio
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id.
138. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1982). See Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 606 F. Supp. 38
(D.D.C. 1984), aft'd, 787 F.2d 655 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Horne v. Adolph Coors Co., 684 F.2d
255 (3d Cir. 1982); Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
139. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974), where the Su-
preme Court stated several objectives of the patent system. Harshaw Chemical Co. was an
unincorporated division of Kewanee. Over a period of years the company developed certain
processes for use in the growth and encapsulation of synthetic crystals for the purification of
raw materials, some of which were considered to be trade secrets. The company eventually
succeeded for the first time in growing a 17-inch crystal that was useful in the detection of
ionizing radiation. A former employee of Harshaw had signed agreements not to disclose the
company's trade secrets. The employees were later hired by respondent Bicron which competed
with Harshaw in producing crystal. Kewanne brought the action seeking damages for misap-
propriation of trade secrets. Id. at 473.
140. Id. at 481. See also United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186-
87 (1933).
In consideration of its disclosure and the consequent benefit to the community, the patent
is granted. An exclusive enjoyment is guaranteed him for seventeen years, but upon the
expiration of that period, the knowledge of the invention ensures to the people who are
thus enabled without restriction to practice it and profit by its use.
Id.
141. Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 481. See also Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653,
668 (1969). "[F]ederal law requires that all ideas in general circulation be dedicated to the
common good unless they are protected by a valid patent." Id.
142. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1982).
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tain classes of inventions can be patented.' 8 Second, the invention must
meet a three-prong test which requires that an invention have novelty, util-
ity, and nonobviousness before it can be patented."" Novelty requires that
the asset was not used, patented, or described by another."" Utility requires
that the invention is useful to the public or the corporation." 6 Nonobvious-
ness requires that the difference between the new asset discovered and the
prior art is nonobvious to a person with ordinary skills involved in the par-
ticular subject matter.147
The patentee receives several benefits if the requirements for patenting
an invention are met. Principally, he receives a monopoly which allows him
to exclude others from using, selling, or making the invention." 8 The gov-
ernment grants this monopoly for a period of seventeen years." 9 However,
the patentee receives the exclusive protection of the federal patent laws on
the condition that he describes the invention in detail which becomes public
if and when the patent is granted. 150
143. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." Id.
144. Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa. 1974). "Congress
has prescribed a three prong test for patentability: novelty, utility and nonobviousness." Id. at
808-09. See also Whitley v. Road Corp., 624 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1980).
145. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless -
(a) The invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or de-
scribed in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof
by the applicant for patent, or
(b) The invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the
date of the application for patent in the United States ....
Id. See Cridlebaugh v. Rudolph, 131 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 779
(1943) ("[a]bsence of novelty automatically denies patentability").
146. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkley & Co., 620 F.2d 1247 (8th Cir. 1980)
(only a minimum amount of utility is required).
147. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982). The invention must meet the standard of nonobviousness.
To determine the factors of nonobviouness see Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383
U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
In a § 103 obviousness analysis, Graham requires that the trier assess certain underlying
facts: (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) the level of ordinary skill in the art,
(3) the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art, and (4) the so-called
"secondary consideration."
King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1016 (1986). See also Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d
1569, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1984); NDM Corp. v. Hayes Prods., Inc., 641 F.2d 1274, 1277 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981); Deering Milliken Research Corp. v. Beaunit Corp.,
538 F.2d 1022 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976).
148. Robinson, supra note 20, at 349.
149. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
150. Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944).
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In comparing the protections of patent law to the protections of trade
secret law, the policies and objectives of each are important to analyze.
This is especially necessary when trying to modify trade secret law, since
state trade secret law will be preempted if its objectives clash with the
objectives of patent law.'6 1 Similarly, under federal law, trade secret law
will be held void if it substantially dissuades individuals from seeking pat-
ents when they have a patentable invention. 52
B. A "Quasi-Patent" Standard
A quasi-patent standard could be used to determine whether certain
trade secrets have property qualities. 58 The elements for this standard
could be borrowed from patent law. Some of the requirements for protec-
tion under patent law could be applied to trade secret law. A patent is
considered property and cannot be taken without due process of law.'"
Recognizing the firm consensus that patents have property qualities, courts
have historically analogized the property qualities in a patent to property
rights held in land. "
A patent is considered property because of its unique statutory require-
ments. The statutory requirements for the patentability of an invention are:
novelty, nonobviousness, and utility."' In addition, an invention must fall
into one of the four statutory subject matter classifications. " The determi-
nation of whether the invention has novelty, nonobviousness, and utility is
wholly separate from the question of whether the invention fits into one of
the four statutory classifications.1 8 Thus, an invention may fit into one of
"As a reward for inventions and to encourage their disclosure, the United States offers a sev-
enteen-year monopoly to an inventor who refrains from keeping his invention as a trade se-
cret." Id.
151. Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 480. See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,
376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964).
152. Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 489. See generally Stern, A Reexamination of Pre-
emption of State Trade Secret Law After Kewanee, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 927 (1974).
153. 2 R. CALLMAN, supra note 61, § 14.02 (some trade secrets do not have property
rights because they fail the uniqueness requirements).
154. Johnson & Johnson, Inc. v. Wallance A. Erickson & Co., 627 F.2d 57, 59 (7th Cir.
1980) (a patent is unequivocally considered property and the owner can not be deprived of it
without due process). See also Hobbs v. United States, 376 F.2d 488, 493 (5th Cir. 1967) (an
inventor has a right in his invention which matures into property when patented).
155. Consolidated Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876) (property rights apply
equally to land as well as to patents).
156. Andis Clipper Co. v. Oster Corp., 481 F. Supp. 1360, 1368 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (to
qualify for a patent, the invention must be novel, nonobvious, and useful).
157. See supra note 143.
158. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961 (C.C.P.A.), vacated in part, 444 U.S. 924 (1979),
affd, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980) (requirements of novelty and utility are distinct and separate from
the question as to whether the invention falls in one of the four statutory classifications). See
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the four subject matter statutory classes but lack novelty, and therefore
may not qualify for patent protection and may not be considered property
of the inventor."
Novelty, nonobviousness, and utility generally are not required before
an invention qualifies for trade secret protection.1 60 Various courts have
held that the state of the art is irrelevant since the question is not whether
the defendant could have learned the information on his own, but whether
he obtained the information independently."" However, variations exist in
the use of the state of the art analysis.
Notwithstanding, some courts have analyzed trade secret cases by us-
ing a standard which involves looking at the prior art. Sarkes Tarzian, Inc.
v. Audio Devices, Inc., ' 6  is a prime example of the use of a quasi-patent
analysis in trade secret law. In determining whether a trade secret existed,
the court used a standard called "discovery."' 3 This standard is stricter
than the Restatement of Torts' standard which does not look at the prior
art. However, the discovery standard is not as strict as would be required to
generally 1 E. LiPSCOMB, LIPscoMB's WALKER ON PATENTS chs. I-IV (3d ed. 1984).
159. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d at 961 (when an invention is not novel it cannot be consid-
ered to have property interests).
160. Computer Print Sys., Inc. v. Lewis, 281 Pa. Super. 240, 241, 422 A.2d 148, 149
(1980); Atlantic Wool Combing Co. v. Norfolk Mills, Inc., 357 F.2d 866, 869 (1st Cir. 1966);
University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 535 n.25 (5th Cir.
1974) (novelty in a patent sense was not required for trade secret protection). See also Cat-
aphote Corp. v. Hudson, 444 F.2d 1313 (5th Cir. 1971). In Hudson, the plaintiff brought an
action against another corporation to enjoin it from using trade secrets that were acquired by
hiring away the plaintiffs employee. Id. at 1313. The court stated that the novelty require-
ment of patent law, where there is a substantial advancement over the prior art, is an improper
standard for determining whether an item qualifies for protection under trade secret law. Id. at
1314. However, the court noted that a minimum novelty was required to show that the asset
was not public knowledge. Id. at 1316. Novelty, which requires an examination of the prior
art, is also not required in order for an invention to qualify as a trade secret under the Restate-
ment. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939).
161. Root & Blyn, supra note 82, at 838.
162. 166 F. Supp. 250 (S.D. Cal. 1958), affid, 283 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. de-
nied, 365 U.S. 869 (1961) (detailed examination of prior art to determine whether a trade
secret existed). Sarkes was involved in the manufacture of components for electronic equip-
ment including silicon rectifiers. The complaint alleged that Audio stole Sarkes' trade secrets
by conspiring with the past employees of Sarkes. The employees conveyed trade secrets to
Audio which gave Audio a competitive edge over Sarkes. Id. at 254. See also A.O. Smith
Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co. of Ohio, 73 F.2d 531, 538-39 (6th Cir. 1934); Sloan v.
Mud Prods., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 916, 927 n.41 (N.D. Okla. 1953); International Indus. v. War-
ren Petroleum Corp., 99 F. Supp. 907, 914 n.12 (D. Del. 1951), affd, 248 F.2d 696 (3d Cir.
1957), cert. dismissed, 355 U.S. 943 (1958).
163. Sarkes Tarzian, 166 F. Supp. at 266. "This is but carrying into effect the principle
declared many years ago by the Supreme Court of the United States that to constitute a trade
secret there must be discovery." Id.
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patent an invention. 6 " The court reasoned that the item must "not occur to
persons in the trade with knowledge of the state of the art or which cannot
be evolved by those skilled in the art."' 65 The Sarkes Tarzian court used
this strict standard to narrow the definition of the types of assets that can
be protected as trade secrets."' Although some courts impose a standard
similar to patentability to determine whether trade secret protection should
be given, the Restatement has rejected the requirement of novelty or inven-
tiveness.1 67 The analysis of the prior art to determine patentability can be
used as a means of separating trade secrets into two categories.
The analysis used in Sarkes Tarzian would not be used to totally dis-
qualify an item from protection, as the court held in that case, but only to
limit the amount of protection. 6 8 Moreover, the analysis would merely de-
termine the trade secret classification of the asset. The classification of the
type of trade secret would, in turn, determine the limitations of the asset's
protection. Under this model the standard to determine whether a trade
secret has property qualities should be based on utility, nonobviousness, and
novelty in a patent sense.'"
164. G. ALEXANDER, COMMERCIAL TORTs 209 (1973) (citing Koehring Co. v. E.D.
Etnyre & Co., 254 F. Supp. 334, 361 (N.D. 11. 1966)). The court in Koehring required the
trade secret to at least amount to discovery, looking expressly at the invention's novelty. Id.
However, other courts have stated that a trade secret need not amount to discovery and can be
anticipated in the prior art. Certain courts have even flatly rejected the analysis in Sarkes
Tarzian. See, e.g., Droeger v. Welsh Sporting Goods Corp., 541 F.2d 790, 793 n.3 (9th Cir.
1976).
165. Sarkes Tarzian, 166 F. Supp. at 258.
166. The court in Sarkes Tarzian proceeded by citing Levine v. E.A. Johnson & Co.,
107 Cal. App. 2d 322, 237 P.2d 309 (1951), stating that this analysis was important to further
the policy of preventing the employee from being hindered from seeking gainful and lawful
employment. Id. at 327, 237 P.2d at 312. See also Continental Car-Na-Var Corp. v. Moseley,
24 Cal. 2d 104, 148 P.2d 9 (1944).
Every individual possesses as a form of property, the right to pursue any calling, business
or profession he may choose. A former employee has the right to engage in a competitive
business for himself and to enter into competition with his former employer, even for the
business of those who had formerly been the customers of his former employer, provided
such competition is fairly and legally conducted.
Id. at 10, 148 P.2d at 12-13.
167. Root & Blyn, supra note 82, at 827 (some courts have used the standard of patent-
ability to determine if trade secret protection should be granted). See, e.g., Morton B. Katz &
Assocs. v. Arnold, 175 Ga. App. 278, 333 S.E.2d 115 (1985) (telemarketing firm did not have
a protectible interest in a "script" since it was not "novel" in light of numerous other similar
scripts). "Elements essential to recovery for wrongful appropriation or conversion of unpat-
ented or unpatentable ideas or products are that the idea must be novel . Id. See also
supra note 162.
168. Sarkes Tarzian, 166 F. Supp. at 280.
169. This model does not require that all trade secrets must be patentable. Instead the
property concept is merely being used as a bench mark to categorize trade secrets.
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C. Notice of a Trade Secret
Distinguishing trade secrets on the basis of having property or non-
property qualities would also affect the manner in which employees receive
notice. Courts have established two ways in which an employee could be
deemed to have entered a confidential relationship; both of these place the
employee on notice of trade secrets.1"' The first occurs where an express
understanding exists between the employer and the employee as to the con-
fidential nature of the information. The second occurs where the employee
can infer the confidential nature of the information from the
circumstances.1 7 1
Under this model, if a court finds that the trade secret is classified as
having "property qualities," an implied notice would be sufficient to hold an
employee accountable. Implied notice exists when the employee can infer
from the circumstances the possibility that a trade secret exists. When an
employer is dealing with a more valuable trade secret, he would take
greater precautions to ensure its secrecy. Naturally, the greater precautions
taken by the employer to ensure secrecy will be apparent to the employee
thereby making it obvious to the employee that a trade secret exists. Ac-
cordingly, an implied notice would be sufficient to protect an employer's
trade secrets that have property qualities.
Where the employer possesses a "nonproperty quality" trade secret,
express notice would be required. The Restatement of Torts' requirements
for qualification of an asset as a trade secret are minimal. Plus, a broad and
vast range of products can fall under trade secret protection in this second
category.172 Therefore, the burden should not be on the employee to iden-
tify what the employer considers to be a trade secret.
Courts are becoming more aware of the problem employees face in
identifying an employer's trade secrets .17 The problem is especially preva-
170. Future Plastics, Inc. v. Ware Shoal Plastics, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 1376 (D.S.C. 1972)
(some basic guidelines for giving notice to employees concerning trade secrets). In Future
Plastics, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was a former employee who misappropriated
trade secrets and other confidential information. In addition, the plaintiff claimed that the
defendant was now using those trade secrets in competition with the plaintiff. Id. at 1378. The
defendant alleged that the items were not trade secrets and that he twice refused to sign a
restrictive covenant. Id. The court, rejecting the majority view, held that the employer-em-
ployee relationship alone is not enough to create a confidential relationship. Id. at 1384.
171. Id. at 1384.
172. See supra notes 75-76.
173. See Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 576, 160 A.2d 430, 433 (1960).
We must therefore be particularly mindful of any effect our decision in this case might
have in disrupting this pattern of employee mobility, both in view of possible restraints
upon an individual in the pursuit of his livelihood and the harm to the public in general in
forestalling, to any extent widespread technological advances.
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lent in those states which have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.
The Act substantially broadens the type of assets that can be protected
under trade secret law. Accordingly, some courts have leaned toward the
possibility of an actual notice requirement. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Con-
trolled Motion174 is viewed as such a move by the courts.
In Electro-Craft, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant copied de-
signs of its motors. 175 The court, in reviewing the secrecy precaution and
the notice requirement, stated that the company should have let the em-
ployee know "in no uncertain terms" that the item was considered a trade
secret. 7 However, the designs were not specifically labeled confidential. 177
The court inferred that the employer's security measures are always inade-
quate if he has not specifically told the employee that the material is confi-
dential.1 78 Therefore, the court found no misappropriation by the
employee.1 79
Interestingly, Electro-Craft was the first decision in Minnesota to ap-
ply the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.180 The Act takes a far more liberal
view in protecting a broader range of products than does the Restatement.
Surprisingly, the Electro-Craft court took a very conservative view concern-
ing notice and suggested that something very close to actual notice should
be given.18' Other state courts have required actual notice. 182 The notice
limitation provides the employee with more assurance that he will not be
sued for misappropriation of his past employer's trade secret. Under the
proposed model, when the court finds a nonproperty quality trade secret,
the employer would have to give actual notice to the employee of the trade
secret. Accordingly, the employee's fiduciary duty to the employer would be
limited to what the employer specifically identified as a trade secret.
D. Length of Protection
Under this model, distinguishing trade secrets on the basis of having
property or nonproperty qualities would also determine the length of time
Id.
174. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, 332 N.W.2d 890 (Minn. 1983).
175. Id. at 893.
176. Id. at 902.
177. Id. at 903.
178. Note, Balancing Interests, supra note 7, at 1002.
179. Electro-Craft Corp., 332 N.W.2d at 904.
180. Id. at 897. Minnesota adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act on August 1, 1980.
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325C.01-.08 (1981 & Supp. 1988).
181. Note, Balancing Interests, supra note 7, at 1002.
182. Comment, Quagmire in Pennsylvania, supra note 1, at 144. "Pennsylvania courts,
however, generally require express notice to employees." Id. (citing Jacobson & Co. v. Int'l
Env't Corp., 427 Pa. 439, 235 A.2d 612 (1967)).
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that the protection should be given. All jurisdictions agree that as long as
the employer holds an item secret, the law grants protection for an unlim-
ited amount of time.183 However, holding an employee to an obligation to a
past employer for an unlimited amount of time can reduce his employment
mobility.184 Accordingly, the current unlimited protection should only apply
where a "property quality" trade secret is found to exist.
The same standard, however, should not apply when the trade secret is
classified as having "nonproperty qualities." Some effort should be made to
limit the length of time that these trade secrets are protected. The courts
could use a reasonableness standard which would take into account the na-
ture of the particular trade secret, the value of the trade secret, and the
degree of competitive edge the trade secret provides the corporation. 185 A
court may deviate from the general rule if the employer establishes a suffi-
cient interest in maintaining unlimited secrecy for a nonproperty quality
trade secret. However, independent consideration should be given to the
employee to maintain indefinite secrecy. In addition, the employer should
likewise inform the employee of the unique obligation the employee will be
under at the onset of the employment relationship.
E. Transfer of the Burden
Currently, an employer actually does not know if he possesses a trade
secret until there is a court determination,88 because a trade secret, unlike
a patent, is not registered."8 7 Under current trade secret law, the burden to
know the existence of the employer's trade secrets is on the employee. 88
This results in increased litigation and decreased employment mobility for
the employee. Litigation could be decreased and employment mobility in-
creased if the burden were switched to the employer to inform the employee
of the trade secret.
This model would switch the burden of initially knowing the existence
183. See supra text accompanying note 83. See generally Comment, Trade Secrets:
How Long Should an Injunction Last?, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 203 (1978) (trade secret protec-
tion can last an infinite amount of time).
184. See supra text accompanying notes 16-23.
185. The same factors that the Restatement uses to determine if an asset qualifies for
trade secret protection also could be used for a non-property quality trade secret to determine
if the length of protection should be increased. See supra text accompanying note 66. A rea-
sonableness standard would be appropriate in determining the length of time for protection
instead of allowing an infinite amount of time as in traditional trade secret law.
186. See supra text accompanying note 66 (the court makes a determination as to the
existence of a trade secret after the application of the six factors contained in the
Restatement).
187. See 1 E. LlPSCOMB, supra note 158, at 100 (there is no registration system for
trade secrets as there is for patents).
188. See supra text accompanying notes 45, 54-57.
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of a trade secret to the employer because the court would have to apply a
two-tier analysis. In the first tier, the court would have to determine
whether a trade secret exists. The court would apply the six factors of the
Restatement in the analysis.189 If the court makes a finding that the tech-
nology was general knowledge or was readily attainable,1 90 no protection
would exist under trade secret law. Also, if the court finds that the technol-
ogy was not readily attainable, protection would still be denied if there were
not enough safeguards to ensure secrecy. In the second tier, the court would
apply the "quasi-patent" standard analysis to determine whether the trade
secret has property qualities.1 9'
The following example will illustrate how the analysis of this two-tier
model would affect the employer's burden. Assume that employer A alleges
that a former employee X disclosed a trade secret to employer B to the
detriment of employer A. Also assume that when the misappropriation ac-
tion went to trial, the court found that indeed employer A possessed a trade
secret, thus satisfying the first tier of the analysis. Furthermore, assume
that, in the second tier of the analysis, the court finds that the trade secret
can be classified as a "nonproperty quality" trade secret. The court must
now determine whether employer A gave employee X actual notice of the
trade secret. If employer A failed to give employee X actual notice, no ac-
tion for misappropriation would exist. As a practical matter, the employer
will specifically inform its employees as to which assets the corporation con-
siders trade secrets rather than taking the risk of a court finding a "non-
property quality" trade secret.
The requirement of actual notice will cause an employer to evaluate
his assets and to consider carefully whether he has real trade secrets. Under
current trade secret law, no incentive exists for an employer to evaluate his
assets on a regular basis."' Employers apparently want the protection of
trade secret law and consider the protection a valuable tool in protecting
proprietary assets, but employers do not think it is important to have a
record of the assets the company considers trade secrets.
F. The Use of Restrictive Covenants
Trade secret law should not protect the additional items added under
189. See supra text accompanying note 66.
190. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text (if an invention is readily attainable
it will not qualify for protection under trade secret law).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 153-69 (a "quasi-patent" standard to deter-
mine if a trade secret has property qualities).
192. There would be an incentive for the employer to evaluate his assets on a regular
basis if trade secret protection were only granted if actual notice of the trade secret was given
to the employee. See supra text accompanying notes 49-54.
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the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. If "know how" is to be protected, this note
proposes that such protection be provided not under trade secret law, but
under contract law through the use of restrictive covenants. The use of re-
strictive covenants involves a body of law that is separate and distinct from
trade secret law. 193 With the rapid growth of technology, an employee can-
not be held liable for every piece of business information with which he
comes in contact. However, if an employer uses a restrictive covenant and
specifically states what is to be held confidential, the information should be
protected, thereby eliminating the current state of confusion.
The use of restrictive covenants could be used effectively by companies
and might eliminate the burden on the courts. Although courts disfavor
covenants not to compete because they excessively restrict an employee, 194
most courts will allow a narrowly tailored restrictive covenant if it is rea-
sonable in length, duration, and geography.'96 Companies should not be al-
lowed to have employees sign a general, open-ended contract or agreement
which simply states that the employee is not to disclose the employer's
trade secrets.196 By requiring each protected piece of information to be ex-
pressly stipulated in the contract, employers will be forced to regularly eval-
uate their assets, and employees will be completely aware of which assets
the employer considers confidential. 9 7
VI. CONCLUSION
The interests of the employee and the employer often come into direct
conflict. The courts should use reasonable means and methods to protect the
employer's proprietary assets. However, an employer's interest in protecting
his investments should be subordinated to an employee's interest in the free
transferability of acquired skills.' 98 Courts should favor the "free spirit of
193. See Chandler v. Washington Toll Bridge Auth., 17 Wash. 2d 591, 600, 137 P.2d
97, 101 (1943) (the existence of a contract may also affect the approach used by the court in
awarding injunctive relief).
194. Consolidated Brands, Inc. v. Mondi, 638 F. Supp. 152 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (courts
disfavor covenants not to compete since it reduces employment mobility).
195. Jacobson & Co. v. Int'l Env't Corp., 427 Pa. 439, 235 A.2d 612 (1967) (a restric-
tive covenant must be reasonable in length, time, and geography). See also Sigma Chem. Co.
v. Harris, 794 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1986).
196. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1987). In various jurisdictions, em-
ployment contracts have been held invalid. For example, under section 16600 of the California
Business & Professional Code, "every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in
a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void." Id. See also Note,
Balanced Approach, supra note 14, at 673 n.12.
197. Robinson, supra note 20, at 388. "In short, there is nothing novel about firms eval-
uating the information they use, claiming some but not all of it as their trade secrets. It may
be more expensive but the individual firm must make a business decision as to whether the
added expense is justified." Id.
198. Comment, Trade Secret Developed by Employee in the Course of Authorized Re-
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competition" 199 instead of employment bondage and decreased mobility. In
addition, the courts should recognize that restraints on employment mobil-
ity could seriously restrict the rate of technological innovation in the United
States. °0
In the past, trade secret law was basically employer biased.2 0 1 Under-
standably, deciding whether to protect the employer's or the employee's in-
terest is difficult. Sometimes a simple balancing approach cannot be taken
without favoring either the employer or the employee. Currently, trade se-
cret law appears to unfairly favor the employer's interests. The balance of
interests should be reassessed to equally consider the employee's interests in
today's changing and competitive society.202
The proposed theoretical model establishes two categories of trade
secrets. These two categories could be labeled as "property quality" trade
secrets and "nonproperty quality" trade secrets. To determine whether a
trade secret has property qualities, a "quasi-patent" analysis could be used.
Trade secrets that have property qualities would only require that the em-
ployer give implied notice to the employee, and the trade secrets would be
protected for an unlimited amount of time. Those trade secrets that do not
have property qualities would require that the employer give actual notice
to the employee and would be restricted in the length of time that it could
be protected. By instituting these modifications in trade secret law, the em-
search May Be Used in Competing with Former Employer, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1473, 1473
(1961) [hereinafter Comment, Competing with Former Employer].
199. Spring Steels, Inc. v. Molloy, 400 Pa. 354, 362, 162 A.2d 370, 374 (1960).
200. Spanner, Trade Secrets Versus Technological Innovation, 87 TECH. REV. 12, 12
(1984).
201. See By-Buk Co. v. Printed Cellophane Tape Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 157, 161, 329
P.2d 147, 151 (1958).
It is sufficient if from the circumstances of the case and the relation of the parties as
employer and employee an agreement to that effect may be implied from the confidential
relation. In fact, it is said in the case of an employee such an obligation exists in the
absence of any stipulation to the contrary.
Id.
202. Comment, Quagmire in Pennsylvania, supra note 1, at 149. Referring to Wexler v.
Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960): "[T]he Wexler court apparently denied relief
solely on the policy consideration that the right of employee mobility was superior to the right
of an owner to maintain proprietary secrets." Id. See also Comment, Competing with Former
Employer, supra note 198, at 1475. Also referring to Wexler:
Award of an injunction. . . would unduly restrict the employee in the free exercise of his
profession. Since the knowledge of a skilled chemist is probably not readily allocable to
the specific tasks he has performed, but is acquired from his entire employment experi-
ence, it may be that enjoining him from disclosing anything about a number of formulas
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ployer's interests will be adequately protected and the employee will be less
restricted in his employment mobility.
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